Wednesday, March 23, 2005
Anti-Secession Law boosts Taiwan's Independence movement
In a classic example of blowback, China's anti-succession law has given a huge boost to the independence movenment. Living a country that has a formal succession law (the clarity act) I find the China's periodic fits over taiwan amusing (well as amusing as something that could start world war III can be--and since Dr. strangelove was hilarious, that can be alot).
This article actual looks closely at Taiwan's internal politics and demonstrates that there is only one thing that could cause a declaration of independence, ham-fisted pressure from mainland China.
Jax
TAIPEI - The passage by the National People's Congress of an Anti-Secession Law authorizing China to use "non-peaceful" means to prevent Taiwan from establishing de jure independence from the "motherland" has generated outrage in Taiwan itself and international concern. But one group has benefited immensely: the Taiwan independence movement.
That this is exactly the reverse of what China intended is a measure both of how badly thought out China's action has been and how little it understands Taiwan.
In Taiwan itself, while the general public reaction to the law is one of almost universal outrage, committed supporters of Taiwanese independence, while fulminating on cue for the TV cameras, are privately gleeful.
The story of the origin and development of the law has been frequently told in recent weeks but each telling seems to miss at least one of the essential details about Taiwan on which, like submerged rocks, Beijing has come to grief.
Initially the law was conceived as a response to Taiwan's Referendum Law, passed in December 2003. The Referendum Law in turn was the result of a campaign played with great deftness and skill by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, who drummed up public opinion in support of the law, and then used the overwhelming public support to force the opposition parties that controlled the legislature to pass the law, despite their decade-long aversion to do anything of the sort.
The opposition had always claimed, especially when it was in government, that a law laying down procedures for people to carry out their constitutional right of referendum might lead to a referendum on Taiwanese independence - with potentially disastrous consequences if China saw this as a casus belli.
If this argument ever had popular support, by early 2003 it was threadbare. Of far greater public concern was that the opposition parties had been seen to be enjoying unprecedented levels of dalliance with authorities in Beijing and, since they were widely expected to win the presidential election in March 2004, there was consternation that they might be engineering a deal with China involving the sacrifice of Taiwan's de facto independence in return for installation as the permanent government of a unified Taiwan province.
Such fears perhaps deliberately exaggerated what the opposition was capable of doing and willing to undertake. But they were deftly used by Chen and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to pressure the opposition into passing the Referendum Law, if only to show in the run-up to the election that they were not in China's pocket.
The law as passed actually ruled out questions on independence or unification as being something on which a referendum might be called. The DPP slammed the opposition for passing what it called a "bird cage" Referendum Law but, nevertheless, nobody could be in any doubt that, once the law was passed, no unification/independence matter could be decided without a vote - even if the law had to be amended to do this.
China radically misinterpreted the law - though it was not the only one to do so. In Taiwan, the Referendum Law was plainly aimed at preventing any reunification deal that lacked a referendum's democratic imprimatur; the intention was specifically to prevent the opposition "selling out" Taiwan should it regain power. China - and others - mistakenly thought, however, that the Referendum Law was to be used to try to further Taiwan independence. Partly this was a result of misinformation that Beijing was getting from its friends in Taiwan's opposition parties, and partly it was the result of Chen and the DPP making promises - as part of their presidential-campaign rhetoric - that they in fact had no chance of keeping. Even if Chen won re-election (which he in fact did), there was no chance that the DPP and its allies would win enough seats in the legislature - a super-majority of 75% - to initiate the bold changes that Chen talked of and China feared. And these changes themselves stopped way short of independence, though they did chip away at those symbols that identified Taiwan with China - especially the constitution, implemented by Chiang Kai-shek in China in 1947 - much to Beijing's ire.
But the plain truth, obvious to anybody resident in Taiwan, and yet obscure and elusive to others, is that Chen would never call a referendum on independence, not because of China's threats or the United States' constraints, but simply because it would never pass. While fewer than one in 10 Taiwanese wants reunification in the foreseeable future, prudent thinking among the Taiwanese means hardline pro-independence support rarely reaches 20% in polls.
Against this background, Chinese fears of "secession" and US fears of a "declaration of independence" are tremendously unrealistic and show an alarming ignorance both of Taiwan's constitutional processes and public opinion. A declaration of independence would involve a constitutional amendment that would have to be passed by 75% of the legislature and then be ratified by a National Assembly convened for the purpose. Given the almost 50:50 split in voting preferences among Taiwanese, it is extremely unlikely that the DPP and its allies would be able to muster this kind of support in the near future. Perhaps the only thing that could seriously alter the issue would be the implosion of the pro-unification opposition parties as a result of Beijing's trying to force the unification issue - the strange Newtonian mechanics of cross-strait relations. (Much More)
This article actual looks closely at Taiwan's internal politics and demonstrates that there is only one thing that could cause a declaration of independence, ham-fisted pressure from mainland China.
Jax
TAIPEI - The passage by the National People's Congress of an Anti-Secession Law authorizing China to use "non-peaceful" means to prevent Taiwan from establishing de jure independence from the "motherland" has generated outrage in Taiwan itself and international concern. But one group has benefited immensely: the Taiwan independence movement.
That this is exactly the reverse of what China intended is a measure both of how badly thought out China's action has been and how little it understands Taiwan.
In Taiwan itself, while the general public reaction to the law is one of almost universal outrage, committed supporters of Taiwanese independence, while fulminating on cue for the TV cameras, are privately gleeful.
The story of the origin and development of the law has been frequently told in recent weeks but each telling seems to miss at least one of the essential details about Taiwan on which, like submerged rocks, Beijing has come to grief.
Initially the law was conceived as a response to Taiwan's Referendum Law, passed in December 2003. The Referendum Law in turn was the result of a campaign played with great deftness and skill by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, who drummed up public opinion in support of the law, and then used the overwhelming public support to force the opposition parties that controlled the legislature to pass the law, despite their decade-long aversion to do anything of the sort.
The opposition had always claimed, especially when it was in government, that a law laying down procedures for people to carry out their constitutional right of referendum might lead to a referendum on Taiwanese independence - with potentially disastrous consequences if China saw this as a casus belli.
If this argument ever had popular support, by early 2003 it was threadbare. Of far greater public concern was that the opposition parties had been seen to be enjoying unprecedented levels of dalliance with authorities in Beijing and, since they were widely expected to win the presidential election in March 2004, there was consternation that they might be engineering a deal with China involving the sacrifice of Taiwan's de facto independence in return for installation as the permanent government of a unified Taiwan province.
Such fears perhaps deliberately exaggerated what the opposition was capable of doing and willing to undertake. But they were deftly used by Chen and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to pressure the opposition into passing the Referendum Law, if only to show in the run-up to the election that they were not in China's pocket.
The law as passed actually ruled out questions on independence or unification as being something on which a referendum might be called. The DPP slammed the opposition for passing what it called a "bird cage" Referendum Law but, nevertheless, nobody could be in any doubt that, once the law was passed, no unification/independence matter could be decided without a vote - even if the law had to be amended to do this.
China radically misinterpreted the law - though it was not the only one to do so. In Taiwan, the Referendum Law was plainly aimed at preventing any reunification deal that lacked a referendum's democratic imprimatur; the intention was specifically to prevent the opposition "selling out" Taiwan should it regain power. China - and others - mistakenly thought, however, that the Referendum Law was to be used to try to further Taiwan independence. Partly this was a result of misinformation that Beijing was getting from its friends in Taiwan's opposition parties, and partly it was the result of Chen and the DPP making promises - as part of their presidential-campaign rhetoric - that they in fact had no chance of keeping. Even if Chen won re-election (which he in fact did), there was no chance that the DPP and its allies would win enough seats in the legislature - a super-majority of 75% - to initiate the bold changes that Chen talked of and China feared. And these changes themselves stopped way short of independence, though they did chip away at those symbols that identified Taiwan with China - especially the constitution, implemented by Chiang Kai-shek in China in 1947 - much to Beijing's ire.
But the plain truth, obvious to anybody resident in Taiwan, and yet obscure and elusive to others, is that Chen would never call a referendum on independence, not because of China's threats or the United States' constraints, but simply because it would never pass. While fewer than one in 10 Taiwanese wants reunification in the foreseeable future, prudent thinking among the Taiwanese means hardline pro-independence support rarely reaches 20% in polls.
Against this background, Chinese fears of "secession" and US fears of a "declaration of independence" are tremendously unrealistic and show an alarming ignorance both of Taiwan's constitutional processes and public opinion. A declaration of independence would involve a constitutional amendment that would have to be passed by 75% of the legislature and then be ratified by a National Assembly convened for the purpose. Given the almost 50:50 split in voting preferences among Taiwanese, it is extremely unlikely that the DPP and its allies would be able to muster this kind of support in the near future. Perhaps the only thing that could seriously alter the issue would be the implosion of the pro-unification opposition parties as a result of Beijing's trying to force the unification issue - the strange Newtonian mechanics of cross-strait relations. (Much More)
