Wednesday, February 16, 2005
Methods of control
The elections in Iraq have been an unprecedented opportunity for ordinary people to influence the destiny of their country, but the National Assembly they have elected is so hedged in with US-imposed restrictions that the cabinet it produces will be more like a chain-gang of prisoners than an independent government.
A prominent Iraqi politician in the Shia coalition told the New Yorker in January that the US had quietly told the parties before the election that there were three conditions for the new government: it should not be under the influence of Iran; it should not ask for the withdrawal of US troops; and it should not install an Islamic state.
One important but neglected issue is the steady re-Ba'athification of the security forces under US direction. This re-Ba'athification is hotly rejected by the majority Shia coalition, and is therefore a key issue for the new government.
The British mass media, as elsewhere, has concentrated on the division of power between the Sunni, Shia and Kurdish communities, and on how power may be shared between the different elements of the 'winning' Shia coalition. What has not been examined is the framework within which the newly-elected National Assembly, and the soon to be appointed 'Iraqi Transitional Government', must operate.
What has been off the agenda, due to a colossal act of media self-censorship, is the division of power between the elected Iraqi National Assembly and the unelected US-led occupation. There are several levers of power that the US has created to retain control. (more)
A prominent Iraqi politician in the Shia coalition told the New Yorker in January that the US had quietly told the parties before the election that there were three conditions for the new government: it should not be under the influence of Iran; it should not ask for the withdrawal of US troops; and it should not install an Islamic state.
One important but neglected issue is the steady re-Ba'athification of the security forces under US direction. This re-Ba'athification is hotly rejected by the majority Shia coalition, and is therefore a key issue for the new government.
The British mass media, as elsewhere, has concentrated on the division of power between the Sunni, Shia and Kurdish communities, and on how power may be shared between the different elements of the 'winning' Shia coalition. What has not been examined is the framework within which the newly-elected National Assembly, and the soon to be appointed 'Iraqi Transitional Government', must operate.
What has been off the agenda, due to a colossal act of media self-censorship, is the division of power between the elected Iraqi National Assembly and the unelected US-led occupation. There are several levers of power that the US has created to retain control. (more)
