Sunday, May 08, 2005
Cold War -- a lose/lose proposition?
This article suggests that both America and Russia may have lost the cold war. The whole article is well worth your time, but I made a Coles notes version for the rest of you.
Jax
First off it talks about Russia's loss of its satellite states and its internal empire, the regions the Russian elite call its "Near Abroad". Recent events like the Rose revoluton in Georgia, and the construction of American bases in Central Asia, are examples of this. It then talks about the limits to America's ability to push this issue further:
In all of this, the Cold War's "winner" has been highly successful in at least one aspect of its global imperial mission: penetrating previously off-limits regions of the former imperial foe, setting up its own military outposts there, and supporting whatever new Bush-friendly (or NATO-friendly) regimes emerged. Unsurprisingly, this has been especially true in regions capable of contributing to nailing down control over the Middle Eastern (and Caspian) oil heartlands of the planet.
There are, however, limits to such a strategy. Two of them are Russian in nature. The first is that, at a time when (despite recent dips) oil and natural gas prices are on the long-term rise, the Russians sit on significant reserves of both, which translate into power reserves in every sense. But Putin's regime sits on another kind of "power reserve" as well. However unmentioned these days, this reserve - the second limit - effectively constrains American action in the world. Militarily, Russia may be only a shadow of the former USSR, but it still has a world-ending supply of nuclear weapons. While no longer a global superpower, in this single arena it remains just that - no small matter at a time when, defying all odds, nuclear weapons have become the global coin of the realm, more so perhaps than in the old two-superpower universe.
A third limit on American power is only now coming into sight: the beginning of the formation of regional power blocs (not necessarily military in nature) in opposition to the lone superpower's various goals. While Greater Europe, still in formation, represents one of these blocs; and some greater Asian combination another (as was indicated by the surprising, if tentative, recent d'etente between China and India as well as the shaky proto-military alliance between Russia and China); perhaps the least expected and commented upon of these blocs lies far closer to home, consisting of a growing set of left-leaning democracies in Latin America determined to pursue their own collective interests regardless of whatever the Bush administration has in mind.
The next section talks about America's Near Abroad, Latin America. It is a catelogue of American failures to influence the region. Mostly they revolve around Hugo Chavez but also Cuba. The article points out that left-leaning democracy seems to have taken root in the most of the region, and in all of the major countries except Mexico, which may be headed that way. In a specific example, the mayor of Mexico City is a major leftist who may run for president and is considered a very strong contender. The government tried to put him up on weak charges of corruption to make him ineligeble to run, the people took to the streets and the government had to back down (sorry, don't know more details).
As it turned out, the Mexican people didn't need Bush's funding or organizational support; nor, it seems, did any other manifestation of "people power" to our south. For what we have been seeing throughout Latin America - as along Russia's border - has been a serial revolt in country after country against the Cold War world and the imperial orders it imposed on its near abroads. Once upon a time, an American administration would have put such revolts down serially, using the CIA, military to military relations, economic power, and aid of various sorts; but, though events in Latin America are finally making the Bush administration sit up and take note, its ability to act is more limited than usual. After all, Iraq is proving a black hole for American power and something of a graveyard for the administration's global ambitions and energies - giving new meaning to that old Vietnam-era word "quagmire".
There can be little question that, in the superpower-funded revolt of the Russian near-abroad and the unsupported revolt of the American near-abroad, you find similar impulses. When imperial power anywhere begins to crumble, it naturally creates space for local and regional experiments in new kinds of power relations. Unfortunately, all our covert (and less than covert) help in "organizing" democracy movements from Ukraine and Georgia to Kyrgyzstan and Belarus gives our leaders the feeling, I fear, that they are actually creating democracies by manipulation in someone else's near abroad.
This fits with my hunch that the people in the Ukraine, in Georgia, and in Lebanon would have revolted even if the Americans had not contributed to the process.
Given all this, it's remarkable what the Bush administration can't do today in its own backyard. It can't fully isolate Cuba; it can't create a regional "coalition of the willing" against Venezuela; it can't simply impose its version of economics on the continent; it can't stop a number of countries in the region from making energy deals of one sort or another with China, Iran, India, and other potential energy competitors. (And if, for a moment, you were to glance north, rather than south, you might notice that it was recently unable to impose its pet boondoggle, the Star Wars anti-missile system, on our recalcitrant northern neighbor Canada. Another small sign of the times.) (Link)
Jax
First off it talks about Russia's loss of its satellite states and its internal empire, the regions the Russian elite call its "Near Abroad". Recent events like the Rose revoluton in Georgia, and the construction of American bases in Central Asia, are examples of this. It then talks about the limits to America's ability to push this issue further:
In all of this, the Cold War's "winner" has been highly successful in at least one aspect of its global imperial mission: penetrating previously off-limits regions of the former imperial foe, setting up its own military outposts there, and supporting whatever new Bush-friendly (or NATO-friendly) regimes emerged. Unsurprisingly, this has been especially true in regions capable of contributing to nailing down control over the Middle Eastern (and Caspian) oil heartlands of the planet.
There are, however, limits to such a strategy. Two of them are Russian in nature. The first is that, at a time when (despite recent dips) oil and natural gas prices are on the long-term rise, the Russians sit on significant reserves of both, which translate into power reserves in every sense. But Putin's regime sits on another kind of "power reserve" as well. However unmentioned these days, this reserve - the second limit - effectively constrains American action in the world. Militarily, Russia may be only a shadow of the former USSR, but it still has a world-ending supply of nuclear weapons. While no longer a global superpower, in this single arena it remains just that - no small matter at a time when, defying all odds, nuclear weapons have become the global coin of the realm, more so perhaps than in the old two-superpower universe.
A third limit on American power is only now coming into sight: the beginning of the formation of regional power blocs (not necessarily military in nature) in opposition to the lone superpower's various goals. While Greater Europe, still in formation, represents one of these blocs; and some greater Asian combination another (as was indicated by the surprising, if tentative, recent d'etente between China and India as well as the shaky proto-military alliance between Russia and China); perhaps the least expected and commented upon of these blocs lies far closer to home, consisting of a growing set of left-leaning democracies in Latin America determined to pursue their own collective interests regardless of whatever the Bush administration has in mind.
The next section talks about America's Near Abroad, Latin America. It is a catelogue of American failures to influence the region. Mostly they revolve around Hugo Chavez but also Cuba. The article points out that left-leaning democracy seems to have taken root in the most of the region, and in all of the major countries except Mexico, which may be headed that way. In a specific example, the mayor of Mexico City is a major leftist who may run for president and is considered a very strong contender. The government tried to put him up on weak charges of corruption to make him ineligeble to run, the people took to the streets and the government had to back down (sorry, don't know more details).
As it turned out, the Mexican people didn't need Bush's funding or organizational support; nor, it seems, did any other manifestation of "people power" to our south. For what we have been seeing throughout Latin America - as along Russia's border - has been a serial revolt in country after country against the Cold War world and the imperial orders it imposed on its near abroads. Once upon a time, an American administration would have put such revolts down serially, using the CIA, military to military relations, economic power, and aid of various sorts; but, though events in Latin America are finally making the Bush administration sit up and take note, its ability to act is more limited than usual. After all, Iraq is proving a black hole for American power and something of a graveyard for the administration's global ambitions and energies - giving new meaning to that old Vietnam-era word "quagmire".
There can be little question that, in the superpower-funded revolt of the Russian near-abroad and the unsupported revolt of the American near-abroad, you find similar impulses. When imperial power anywhere begins to crumble, it naturally creates space for local and regional experiments in new kinds of power relations. Unfortunately, all our covert (and less than covert) help in "organizing" democracy movements from Ukraine and Georgia to Kyrgyzstan and Belarus gives our leaders the feeling, I fear, that they are actually creating democracies by manipulation in someone else's near abroad.
This fits with my hunch that the people in the Ukraine, in Georgia, and in Lebanon would have revolted even if the Americans had not contributed to the process.
Given all this, it's remarkable what the Bush administration can't do today in its own backyard. It can't fully isolate Cuba; it can't create a regional "coalition of the willing" against Venezuela; it can't simply impose its version of economics on the continent; it can't stop a number of countries in the region from making energy deals of one sort or another with China, Iran, India, and other potential energy competitors. (And if, for a moment, you were to glance north, rather than south, you might notice that it was recently unable to impose its pet boondoggle, the Star Wars anti-missile system, on our recalcitrant northern neighbor Canada. Another small sign of the times.) (Link)
