Friday, April 08, 2005
Yes, I am posting an article about Indian naval strategy. Trust me.
This article is a few years old but naval strategy doesn't move fast. the middle has been cut but you can find it by following the link.
The author is one of the grand strategy guys in the US navy. He wrote a book called the Pentagon's New Map. This books is interesting both in what it means to say and what it says unintentionally. The strategy put forward in that book has considerable potential, thought the tactics suggested to get to is done are probably counterproductive.
Jax
In February of this year, I had the pleasure of attending the Indian Navy's first-ever International Fleet Review in Mumbai, where I made a presentation to a symposium audience of 16 Chiefs of Naval Staff and dozens of flag officers from an additional 13 Navies. This fleet review, which went by the motto "Bridges of Friendship," essentially was the Indian Navy's "coming out" party after many years of building up and modernizing its force structure, mostly through foreign purchases.
You may ask, "Coming out for what?" Frankly, that was the real theme of the high-powered symposium, as well as of numerous discussions I had with Indian flag officers, both active and retired. In many ways, this grand celebration was the swan song for a generation of Indian admirals who propelled this once humble coastal force to its current heights as the world's fourth-largest navy. Not only do they want the international community to take note and show some respect, but they also are looking for some clear sense of where their Navy fits in this messy post-Cold War security environment.
Future Pathways of the Indian Navy
It is fair to say that every Indian admiral I spoke with represented his own school of thought, but I sensed two broad strategic factions, which I dub the Soviet School and the British School. This division recalls not only the perceived operational disparity between the Eastern and Western fleets (the former long considered the "Russian half" of the Indian Navy; the latter the "British half") but also the difference between a land-oriented great power's strategic employment of naval force and that of a sea-oriented one.
Not surprisingly, most of the British School admirals I met had studied at the U.S. Naval War College. Conversely, I could discuss my love for Russian poetry - in the original - with those of the Soviet School. I further subdivide each school into two wings: those admirals who believe the Indian Ocean "belongs" to the Indian Navy (and not to any "meddlesome outsiders," including the U.S. Navy) and those who believe the Indian Navy "belongs" to something larger - typically, the collective good of global maritime security.
Putting those two axes together, I see four future pathways for the Indian Navy;
1. Minimum-Deterrent Navy (Soviet School / Regional Focus). This is the weakest long-term outcome because it relegates the Navy to an adjunct to the Army and Air Force in India's continuing nuclear arms race with Pakistan. This tendency most recently is demonstrated in New Delhi's declaration to remain "equal" to any Pakistani move to put nuclear missiles on its submarines (1). Recalling the Soviet Navy's bastion strategy, this is a go-nowhere, do-little navy.
2. Sea-Denial Navy (Soviet School / Global Ambition). This is an anti-China navy that seeks to export an anti-access strategy to the South China Sea. Like the old Soviet fleet, it focuses on anti-ship capabilities with an emphasis on attack submarines. In its most aggressive form, it might be construed by some as an anti-U.S. navy in terms of its modest capacity for power projection toward the Persian Gulf. During the fleet review's finale, Indian naval commandos demonstrated their quick-strike skills by planting explosive charges on three mock oil rigs in Mumbai's Back Bay. They demolished the platforms to the delight of the huge crowds lining the shore, providing the VIP audience of foreign admirals a none too subtle reminder of where India resides, namely, right along the sea route that carries the majority of the world's energy traffic from the Middle East to developing Asia.
3. Sea Lines of Communication-Stability Navy (British School / Regional Focus). This is the polar opposite of the sea-denial navy, for it takes as its prime task the preservation of the Indian Ocean as a safe transit for global commerce. This Indian Navy seeks to supplant the U.S. Navy as the region's sea-based Leviathan, not so much because it wants the United States out, but because India believes this is an appropriate regional security role for it to fill as its economy emerges. Another way to describe this navy is the "Mini-Me Navy," or the Indian Navy's regionalized version of the U.S. Navy - same rough spread of capabilities, just one-eighth the size.
4. International Coalition Navy (British School / Global Ambition). This is the most ambitious navy, for it assumes two key developments: (1) a lessening of the land-based rivalries with Pakistan and China; and (2) a far bigger share of the Indian defense budget going to the navy, which now receives around 15%. In a practical sense, this is a "niche navy," or India's version of the current Royal Navy: a pro-international norms force that can deploy with some genuine reach when combined with the U.S. Navy in a multinational naval coalition. On the face of it, some nations might instinctively fear an Indian Navy of such capability, but such a long-term development would signal a secure and confident New Delhi looking to do its part for global security maintenance. As a rule, dangerous powers field large armies and air forces, not large navies.
Which navy India will end up with is anyone's guess. Based on everything I heard in Mumbai, strong rationales exist within the Indian Navy for each outcome. But clearly, for India to achieve a world-class navy, its leaders have to move beyond viewing the fleet as a supplemental tool in New Delhi's long-standing rivalries with its neighbors, toward an expansive security vision that takes into account the nation's global economic status as an emerging information-technology superpower.
Why India Matters
As noted diplomat Sashi Tharoor argues, India is probably "the most important country for the future of the world."(5) If globalization succeeds in the United States or the European Union, no one will be too surprised. After all, globalization demands less change of these countries than it does of the world around them. And if globalization fails in China or Russia, many likewise will be unsurprised, for it requires much change from both societies - perhaps too much too quickly. But whether globalization succeeds in India should interest just about everyone around the world, for if globalization can succeed in a democratic society where half the population is illiterate and terribly impoverished, then it can succeed just about anywhere. Conversely, if it cannot succeed in a free-market economy that features the world's largest pool of information technology workers, there is little hope for much of the world's population.
Not too long ago, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld characterized India as a country "threatening other people, including the U.S., Western Europe and countries in West Asia." (6) In my dealings with Wall Street as part of a Naval War College project on globalization, I have spoken with a number of financial executives about India and its role in the global economy, and I have found quite a different appreciation there (7). In fact, besides China, there is no country in the world about which there is such a huge gap between how the U.S. security establishment and the U.S. financial establishment view - respectively - the security "threat" and the economic "opportunity."
India suffers some profound military insecurities - the sort that often derail a society's best attempts to open itself to the outside world. The Indian Navy is the country's best near- and long-term instrument for positively asserting itself as a force for regional and global stability. The Bush administration needs to think seriously about what sort of security relationship it wants with India in the coming years. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's May trip to New Delhi was a huge step in the right direction, signaling an easing of the restrictions on military contacts imposed by the Clinton administration following Indian nuclear weapons tests in 1998. Let's hope it jump starts a far broader menu of strategic cooperation. (Link)
The author is one of the grand strategy guys in the US navy. He wrote a book called the Pentagon's New Map. This books is interesting both in what it means to say and what it says unintentionally. The strategy put forward in that book has considerable potential, thought the tactics suggested to get to is done are probably counterproductive.
Jax
In February of this year, I had the pleasure of attending the Indian Navy's first-ever International Fleet Review in Mumbai, where I made a presentation to a symposium audience of 16 Chiefs of Naval Staff and dozens of flag officers from an additional 13 Navies. This fleet review, which went by the motto "Bridges of Friendship," essentially was the Indian Navy's "coming out" party after many years of building up and modernizing its force structure, mostly through foreign purchases.
You may ask, "Coming out for what?" Frankly, that was the real theme of the high-powered symposium, as well as of numerous discussions I had with Indian flag officers, both active and retired. In many ways, this grand celebration was the swan song for a generation of Indian admirals who propelled this once humble coastal force to its current heights as the world's fourth-largest navy. Not only do they want the international community to take note and show some respect, but they also are looking for some clear sense of where their Navy fits in this messy post-Cold War security environment.
Future Pathways of the Indian Navy
It is fair to say that every Indian admiral I spoke with represented his own school of thought, but I sensed two broad strategic factions, which I dub the Soviet School and the British School. This division recalls not only the perceived operational disparity between the Eastern and Western fleets (the former long considered the "Russian half" of the Indian Navy; the latter the "British half") but also the difference between a land-oriented great power's strategic employment of naval force and that of a sea-oriented one.
Not surprisingly, most of the British School admirals I met had studied at the U.S. Naval War College. Conversely, I could discuss my love for Russian poetry - in the original - with those of the Soviet School. I further subdivide each school into two wings: those admirals who believe the Indian Ocean "belongs" to the Indian Navy (and not to any "meddlesome outsiders," including the U.S. Navy) and those who believe the Indian Navy "belongs" to something larger - typically, the collective good of global maritime security.
Putting those two axes together, I see four future pathways for the Indian Navy;
1. Minimum-Deterrent Navy (Soviet School / Regional Focus). This is the weakest long-term outcome because it relegates the Navy to an adjunct to the Army and Air Force in India's continuing nuclear arms race with Pakistan. This tendency most recently is demonstrated in New Delhi's declaration to remain "equal" to any Pakistani move to put nuclear missiles on its submarines (1). Recalling the Soviet Navy's bastion strategy, this is a go-nowhere, do-little navy.
2. Sea-Denial Navy (Soviet School / Global Ambition). This is an anti-China navy that seeks to export an anti-access strategy to the South China Sea. Like the old Soviet fleet, it focuses on anti-ship capabilities with an emphasis on attack submarines. In its most aggressive form, it might be construed by some as an anti-U.S. navy in terms of its modest capacity for power projection toward the Persian Gulf. During the fleet review's finale, Indian naval commandos demonstrated their quick-strike skills by planting explosive charges on three mock oil rigs in Mumbai's Back Bay. They demolished the platforms to the delight of the huge crowds lining the shore, providing the VIP audience of foreign admirals a none too subtle reminder of where India resides, namely, right along the sea route that carries the majority of the world's energy traffic from the Middle East to developing Asia.
3. Sea Lines of Communication-Stability Navy (British School / Regional Focus). This is the polar opposite of the sea-denial navy, for it takes as its prime task the preservation of the Indian Ocean as a safe transit for global commerce. This Indian Navy seeks to supplant the U.S. Navy as the region's sea-based Leviathan, not so much because it wants the United States out, but because India believes this is an appropriate regional security role for it to fill as its economy emerges. Another way to describe this navy is the "Mini-Me Navy," or the Indian Navy's regionalized version of the U.S. Navy - same rough spread of capabilities, just one-eighth the size.
4. International Coalition Navy (British School / Global Ambition). This is the most ambitious navy, for it assumes two key developments: (1) a lessening of the land-based rivalries with Pakistan and China; and (2) a far bigger share of the Indian defense budget going to the navy, which now receives around 15%. In a practical sense, this is a "niche navy," or India's version of the current Royal Navy: a pro-international norms force that can deploy with some genuine reach when combined with the U.S. Navy in a multinational naval coalition. On the face of it, some nations might instinctively fear an Indian Navy of such capability, but such a long-term development would signal a secure and confident New Delhi looking to do its part for global security maintenance. As a rule, dangerous powers field large armies and air forces, not large navies.
Which navy India will end up with is anyone's guess. Based on everything I heard in Mumbai, strong rationales exist within the Indian Navy for each outcome. But clearly, for India to achieve a world-class navy, its leaders have to move beyond viewing the fleet as a supplemental tool in New Delhi's long-standing rivalries with its neighbors, toward an expansive security vision that takes into account the nation's global economic status as an emerging information-technology superpower.
Why India Matters
As noted diplomat Sashi Tharoor argues, India is probably "the most important country for the future of the world."(5) If globalization succeeds in the United States or the European Union, no one will be too surprised. After all, globalization demands less change of these countries than it does of the world around them. And if globalization fails in China or Russia, many likewise will be unsurprised, for it requires much change from both societies - perhaps too much too quickly. But whether globalization succeeds in India should interest just about everyone around the world, for if globalization can succeed in a democratic society where half the population is illiterate and terribly impoverished, then it can succeed just about anywhere. Conversely, if it cannot succeed in a free-market economy that features the world's largest pool of information technology workers, there is little hope for much of the world's population.
Not too long ago, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld characterized India as a country "threatening other people, including the U.S., Western Europe and countries in West Asia." (6) In my dealings with Wall Street as part of a Naval War College project on globalization, I have spoken with a number of financial executives about India and its role in the global economy, and I have found quite a different appreciation there (7). In fact, besides China, there is no country in the world about which there is such a huge gap between how the U.S. security establishment and the U.S. financial establishment view - respectively - the security "threat" and the economic "opportunity."
India suffers some profound military insecurities - the sort that often derail a society's best attempts to open itself to the outside world. The Indian Navy is the country's best near- and long-term instrument for positively asserting itself as a force for regional and global stability. The Bush administration needs to think seriously about what sort of security relationship it wants with India in the coming years. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's May trip to New Delhi was a huge step in the right direction, signaling an easing of the restrictions on military contacts imposed by the Clinton administration following Indian nuclear weapons tests in 1998. Let's hope it jump starts a far broader menu of strategic cooperation. (Link)
