Tuesday, March 29, 2005
Do not go gentle: Syria in Lebanon
Syria has not played all of its lebanese cards yet. The withdrawal of their forces, if it completed is not a critical loss of its influnce in Lebanon. Here is why the lebanese street protests are far from the end of the game (If there was anywhere the U.S. would gain from secretly places advisers/spies/assassins it is Lebanon. There is a shadow war brewing.
Jax
Last month's assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut and its political fallout have proved portentous developments for Syria, to say the least. Even if Damascus is innocent of any involvement or if rogue elements in one of its 14 intelligence agencies carried out the murder, the effect remains unchanged. It has set in motion widespread civil opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and renewed calls from the international community for a complete Syrian withdrawal from its neighbor.
Not only the United States but also the likes of France, Russia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have publicly called on Syria to quit Lebanon. With so many forces falling into alignment against Damascus, the increasingly isolated regime of President Bashar Assad confronts a shrinking universe of options with which to maintain its strategic leverage in the region. In the space of a few weeks, Assad has stepped back from an intransigent refusal to consider withdrawing from Lebanon to a conciliatory position promising the removal of Syrian troops and intelligence forces within "a few months". Unfolding events in Lebanon affect not only Syria, but have the potential to alter the balance of power in the region.
A full withdrawal from Lebanon in the face of Western pressure would represent a serious humiliation for the ossified Ba'athist regime, which may not be able to survive such a display of perceived weakness. Surrounded by hostile and semi-hostile states, Lebanon stands alone as part of a Syrian sphere of influence. In important respects, Lebanon is the mortar holding together the bricks of a weak regime. Over the course of three decades, Syria has transformed Lebanon into a vassal state that lacks any true independence - Syria doesn't even recognize Lebanese passports or maintain an embassy in Beirut. The Syrian Ba'athists have long considered Lebanon an integral part of their concept of Bilad al-Sham, or "Greater Syria", a territorial abstraction that also lays claim to Israel, Jordan and parts of Turkey. It is a construct that carries substantial ideological currency and losing its position in Lebanon would only serve to bring Damascus' regional ambitions to an ignominious end. This explains its flurry of diplomatic activity to help place a pan-Arab patina on any withdrawal agreement.
In addition, Syria may face harsh economic realities if forced to quit Lebanon. Perhaps 20% or more of the Syrian economy is based on Lebanese sources of revenue. Up to a million Syrians work in Lebanon, where they earn respectable wages, much of which is remitted to Syria. Commissions on business deals and extensive corruption also benefit the well-heeled in Syria. Syrian interests control much of the country's resources and Syrian domination of the robust Bekaa Valley drug trade also provides significant streams of revenue. Losing its economic suzerainty over Lebanon could cripple an already teetering Syrian economy.
Most important, however, a pliant Lebanon provides Syria strategic depth along its western frontier, a crucial buffer Damascus has relied on to check its Israeli adversary. Quite simply, Lebanon is Damascus' strongest negotiating card with Israel. Losing Lebanon, in the full sense of the word, would represent a significant attenuation of Syria's deterrent posture with Israel - and, if that is lost, a diminution of leverage over the Palestinian issue may not be far behind.
Damascus will not relinquish that easily, and removing 14,000 troops from Lebanon is not especially important from a strategic standpoint. Damascus is not without arrows in its quiver. It has extended its tentacles deeply into Lebanese society, effectively controlling its political, economic and military/intelligence apparatus. Its intelligence services, which are deeply entrenched within Lebanon, are of far greater importance. Their cheek-by-jowl relationship with Lebanese intelligence and thousands of local informants ensure that a pro forma closing of their main office will not end Syrian influence. They still wield the ability to shape political developments and destabilize Lebanon by unleashing massive civil strife.
In addition, Damascus still maintains great influence over Hezbollah, which one former senior US Federal Bureau of Investigation official described as "the best light infantry in the world". Syrian patronage of Hezbollah is well known and its logic rather simple. Its 25,000-man force, armed with 10,000 rockets and missiles, is a strategic asset that Syria has used as leverage in its conflict with Israel, especially with respect to the Golan Heights. Damascus has jealously guarded Hezbollah's position in Lebanon and disarmed all of its rivals. In the face of a Syrian withdrawal, Hezbollah and other Lebanese concerns that have benefited from Syrian patronage may very well resort to violence to protect their interests. Hezbollah may choose to foment strife, conveying the all too clear message that there will be no stability in Lebanon without Syria's steadying hand. Recent bombings in Christian suburbs of Beirut may provide a foretaste of what lies ahead.
This could potentially lead to widespread unrest, even civil war, which would have major ramifications in Israel, Syria and beyond. Some Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah has recently reinvigorated attempts to subcontract attacks in Israel by Palestinian militant groups. A Lebanese civil war may in fact redound to Hezbollah's favor, as a Syrian withdrawal would leave Hezbollah the most powerful force in Lebanon - more powerful than the Lebanese army. (More)
Jax
Last month's assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut and its political fallout have proved portentous developments for Syria, to say the least. Even if Damascus is innocent of any involvement or if rogue elements in one of its 14 intelligence agencies carried out the murder, the effect remains unchanged. It has set in motion widespread civil opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and renewed calls from the international community for a complete Syrian withdrawal from its neighbor.
Not only the United States but also the likes of France, Russia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have publicly called on Syria to quit Lebanon. With so many forces falling into alignment against Damascus, the increasingly isolated regime of President Bashar Assad confronts a shrinking universe of options with which to maintain its strategic leverage in the region. In the space of a few weeks, Assad has stepped back from an intransigent refusal to consider withdrawing from Lebanon to a conciliatory position promising the removal of Syrian troops and intelligence forces within "a few months". Unfolding events in Lebanon affect not only Syria, but have the potential to alter the balance of power in the region.
A full withdrawal from Lebanon in the face of Western pressure would represent a serious humiliation for the ossified Ba'athist regime, which may not be able to survive such a display of perceived weakness. Surrounded by hostile and semi-hostile states, Lebanon stands alone as part of a Syrian sphere of influence. In important respects, Lebanon is the mortar holding together the bricks of a weak regime. Over the course of three decades, Syria has transformed Lebanon into a vassal state that lacks any true independence - Syria doesn't even recognize Lebanese passports or maintain an embassy in Beirut. The Syrian Ba'athists have long considered Lebanon an integral part of their concept of Bilad al-Sham, or "Greater Syria", a territorial abstraction that also lays claim to Israel, Jordan and parts of Turkey. It is a construct that carries substantial ideological currency and losing its position in Lebanon would only serve to bring Damascus' regional ambitions to an ignominious end. This explains its flurry of diplomatic activity to help place a pan-Arab patina on any withdrawal agreement.
In addition, Syria may face harsh economic realities if forced to quit Lebanon. Perhaps 20% or more of the Syrian economy is based on Lebanese sources of revenue. Up to a million Syrians work in Lebanon, where they earn respectable wages, much of which is remitted to Syria. Commissions on business deals and extensive corruption also benefit the well-heeled in Syria. Syrian interests control much of the country's resources and Syrian domination of the robust Bekaa Valley drug trade also provides significant streams of revenue. Losing its economic suzerainty over Lebanon could cripple an already teetering Syrian economy.
Most important, however, a pliant Lebanon provides Syria strategic depth along its western frontier, a crucial buffer Damascus has relied on to check its Israeli adversary. Quite simply, Lebanon is Damascus' strongest negotiating card with Israel. Losing Lebanon, in the full sense of the word, would represent a significant attenuation of Syria's deterrent posture with Israel - and, if that is lost, a diminution of leverage over the Palestinian issue may not be far behind.
Damascus will not relinquish that easily, and removing 14,000 troops from Lebanon is not especially important from a strategic standpoint. Damascus is not without arrows in its quiver. It has extended its tentacles deeply into Lebanese society, effectively controlling its political, economic and military/intelligence apparatus. Its intelligence services, which are deeply entrenched within Lebanon, are of far greater importance. Their cheek-by-jowl relationship with Lebanese intelligence and thousands of local informants ensure that a pro forma closing of their main office will not end Syrian influence. They still wield the ability to shape political developments and destabilize Lebanon by unleashing massive civil strife.
In addition, Damascus still maintains great influence over Hezbollah, which one former senior US Federal Bureau of Investigation official described as "the best light infantry in the world". Syrian patronage of Hezbollah is well known and its logic rather simple. Its 25,000-man force, armed with 10,000 rockets and missiles, is a strategic asset that Syria has used as leverage in its conflict with Israel, especially with respect to the Golan Heights. Damascus has jealously guarded Hezbollah's position in Lebanon and disarmed all of its rivals. In the face of a Syrian withdrawal, Hezbollah and other Lebanese concerns that have benefited from Syrian patronage may very well resort to violence to protect their interests. Hezbollah may choose to foment strife, conveying the all too clear message that there will be no stability in Lebanon without Syria's steadying hand. Recent bombings in Christian suburbs of Beirut may provide a foretaste of what lies ahead.
This could potentially lead to widespread unrest, even civil war, which would have major ramifications in Israel, Syria and beyond. Some Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah has recently reinvigorated attempts to subcontract attacks in Israel by Palestinian militant groups. A Lebanese civil war may in fact redound to Hezbollah's favor, as a Syrian withdrawal would leave Hezbollah the most powerful force in Lebanon - more powerful than the Lebanese army. (More)
